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Informal financial institutions (IFIs), among them the ubiquitous rotating savings and credit associa-
tions, are of ancient origin.  Owned and self-managed by local people, poor and non-poor, they are 
self-help organizations which mobilize their own resources, cover their costs and finance their 
growth from their profits. With the expansion of the money economy, they have spread into new 
areas and grown in numbers, size and diversity; but ultimately, most have remained restricted in size, 
outreach and duration. Are they best left alone, or should they be helped to upgrade their operations 
and integrate into the wider financial market? Under conducive policy conditions, some have sponta-
neously taken the opportunity of evolving into semiformal or formal microfinance institutions 
(MFIs). This has usually yielded great benefits in terms of financial deepening, sustainability and 
outreach. Donors may build on these indigenous foundations and provide support for various options 
of institutional development, among them: incentives-driven mainstreaming through networking; 
encouraging the establishment of new IFIs in areas devoid of financial services; linking IFIs/MFIs to 
banks; strengthening NGOs as promoters of good practices; and, in a nonrepressive policy environ-





1.  Origins 
 
Labor, rice and money 
 
In March 1967, on one of my first field trips in Liberia, I had the opportunity to observe a group of a 
dozen Mano peasants cutting trees in a field belonging to one of them. Before they started their work, 
they placed hoe-shaped masks in a small circle, chanted words and - turned into animals. One turned 
into a lion, another one into a bush hog, and so on, and they continued to imitate those animals 
throughout the whole day, as they worked hard on their land.. I realized I was onto something serious, 
and at the end of the day, when they had put the masks into a bag and changed back into humans, I 
started asking questions. I learned that they worked as a group, tackling the fields of each one in turn, 
carrying out all the tasks performed by men. For the activities attributed to the female sex, the women 
organized their own group. (Seibel 1967) During subsequent visits to each of the 17 ethnic groups in 
Liberia over extensive periods in the two years that followed, I continued to ask questions. The study 
started with group work; it ended with informal finance. 
 
All over Liberia, I found people forming self-help groups in which each person regularly contributed 
equal amounts of something valuable: labour, rice, money or other items. Among the Gbandi, Loma and 
Kissi in the north-east, you could still find masses of twisted iron rods, with one flat and one round end 
– the so-called Kissi pennies, which was once the local currency before the Americo-Liberians 
introduced the US dollar. In all of these groups, one participant at a time received the accumulated total 
which he could use for his own individual benefit: to fell trees with the help of a rotating work group, to 
feed a wedding party with the rice accumulated by a rice savings group, or as microenterprise working 
capital provided by a rotating savings group. A cycle was considered to be complete when each member 
had received the total once over. A new cycle could then start with the same or a different membership.  
 
Accumulating and reallocating labour, rice or money are three seemingly different forms of economic 
cooperation. Yet in the eyes of a peasant whom I met in the Ivory Coast in 1985, they are all about 
financial intermediation: "Le travail, c'est notre argent!" In Ghana, in 1979, I saw groups of women 
jointly producing palm-oil which they sold on the market, allocating the proceeds to one member of the 
group at a time. Most of these groups also provided social insurance by allocating scarce resources, out 
of turn, to members in emergency situations.  In the early days this consisted mainly of food items 
whereas nowadays it is usually money.  
 
Indigenous origins, world-wide diffusion 
 
The institution of rotating savings is ancient, dating back at least to the 16th century, when Yoruba 
slaves carried it to the Caribbean, as part of their institutional luggage – or social capital. Both the term 
`esusu` and the practice have persisted to this day, as esu in the Bahamas, susu  in Tobago or sou in 
Trinidad. Among the Yoruba in Nigeria today, there is hardly a single adult who is not a member in one 
or even several esusu, numbering anything between two and several dozen or even hundreds of 
members. The institution exists all over West Africa as well as in many other parts of the world, where 
it is an integral part of the local microeconomy and referred to with its own vernacular term (arisan in 
Indonesia, paluwagan in the Philippines, gameya in Egypt, ekub in Ethiopia, and cuchubal in Guatemala 







With the expansion of the money economy, these informal financial institutions (IFIs) have not lost their 
vigor. Quite to the contrary, they have multiplied, both in number and diversity. Banks, with their 
inappropriate products and practices, have not prevented the IFIs from spreading. In many instances, 
even the staff of commercial and central banks (as in the case of Bank Indonesia) have been found to 
participate. Some banks have even adopted the financial technologies used, such as daily deposit 
collection adopted by Bank Dagang Bali in Indonesia and by the Northern Mindanao Development 
Bank in the Philippines. 
 
 
2.  Evolutionary trends 
 
From labour to credit...  
 
Substantial changes have occurred in recent decades. Although with no predetermined pattern, these 
changes have tended to be in the following directions: 
 
  - from labour, kind or premonetary currency, to cash, 
  - from non-financial to financial groups, 
  - from rotating to nonrotating patterns, 
  - from short-lived to permanent groups, 
  - from savings only to savings-driven credit. 
 
Groups and processes of change have been open and flexible, adapting to varying circumstances, as 
appropriate. For example, in a first phase, a rotating work group may offer its services for a wage and 
allocate the total to one member at a time. In a second phase, it may abandon the rotating pattern by 
keeping the income in a joint savings fund for emergencies, joint activities or distribution at the end of 
the year. In a third phase, it may turn itself into a credit association, using the savings as a permanent 
fund for providing loans to members. In a fourth phase, as the financial volume increases, the lending 
becomes commercialized as indicated by high interest rates and insistence on collateral. In this phase, 
income interest payments become the main form of internal savings mobilization.  
 
... and from traditional organizations to microfinance 
 
My first studies in the 1960s were devoted to traditional organizations (Seibel & Massing 1974), a term 
which – at best - evoked the interest of anthropologists. During the 1970s, technical assistance agencies 
rediscovered these organizations under an old name used by Raiffeisen a hundred years earlier: self-help 
groups  (Seibel & Damachi 1982) In the mid-1980s, they changed into informal financial institutions 
(Seibel & Marx 1987). Finally, in 1990, inspired by the 1989 World Bank Conference on 
Microenterprises, I proposed to the Economics Institute in Boulder, CO, that it offer part of its program 
in World Banking and Finance under the heading of Microfinance, comprising both microsavings and 
microcredit (Seibel 1996). This new term reflects the fact that it becomes increasingly difficult to clearly 
distinguish between formal and nonformal origins and practices. 
 
Local monetization and institutional innovation 
 
The most important innovation has been the evolution from a non-rotating group - saving in labour, 
livestock, commodities, premonetary means of payment or hard c ash  - to a  non-rotating credit 
institution which mobilizes its own savings for the purpose of building up a credit fund. In Liberia, for 
example, this process started with the opening of the Firestone plantations in the 1930s and reached 




single most important factor which led to the emergence of IFIs, their transformation into nonrotating 
microfinance institutions and their continuous growth, appears to have been the monetization of a local 
economy. In severely undermonetized economies, as, for example,  in rural Laos (Kunkel & Seibel 
1997),  IFIs are virtually absent. 
 
Daily deposit collection 
 
Institutional innovation also pertains to the local emergence of e ntirely new informal financial 
institutions. Daily deposit collection is a financial institution on West African markets and we can trace 
this back to about about fifty years ago. It is called ajo among the Yoruba of Nigeria, anago susu in 
Ghana, nago in Ivory Coast (nago or anago = Nigerian), yesyes in Southern Togo, jojuma among the 
Kotokoli in central Togo. The deposit collector may serve anything between 200 and 600 clients a day. 
From each he collects a fixed amount which is then registered on a printed card. By the end of the 
month he returns the total, keeping the amount of one daily deposit as a collector's fee. The efficiency of 
the anago susu is far beyond the possibilities of even the most advanced modern bank. On one of the 
markets in Accra I measured the time it took on average to make a deposit including the walking time 
from one client to the next: 17 seconds. Making a microloan took just under one minute. In the mid-
1980s, the deposit collectors in Accra formed the Greater Accra Susu Collectors Association, which was 
registered and planned to set up its own bank, but the authorities were not favorable (Seibel & Marx 
1987). Today (February 2000), the Ghana Cooperative Susu Collectors Association, with 397 members 
out of an estimated total of 1040 susu collectors, covers all of Ghana. The World Bank, together with 
IFAD  and the African Development Bank, is in the process of supporting linkages of susu collectors 
with rural banks and other formal institutions and the establishment of a national risk fund by the 
association. 
 
Dhikuti, the small businessman's self-help finance company  
 
There are numerous other forms of institutional upgrading to be found worldwide. In Nepal, institutional 
upgrading has taken a different route. Until the 1950s, the dikur or dhikuti was a simple rotating savings 
association among Thakali traders. Since then, it has spread throughout all towns and most ethnicities in 
Nepal and become  the small businessman's self-help bank (Seibel & Shrestha 1988). As business 
opportunities grew and money became scarce, secret bidding (widespread also in the Chinese hui and 
the Vietnamese ho) replaced allocation by lottery. For example, at the first turn, the lowest bidder may 
accept a pot of $1000 for $600, reducing individual contributions by 40% or putting the balance of $400 
into an emerging loan fund. In response to a new law permitting the establishment of finance companies, 
the first dhikuti have now started to register as finance companies and this has substantially altered the 
traditional pattern of rotating savings and credit. The most prominent of these is the Himalaya Finance 
and Savings Company, which offers various savings and credit products to the poor and near-poor 
throughout Nepal, including contractual savings and term finance. At some point, up to 600 daily 
savings collectors collected deposits of US$ 0.15 per day, before new central bank regulations led to a 
reduction in the number of collectors and an increase in deposit amounts. (Seibel & Schrader 1999) 
 
 
3.   Donor options 
 
3.1  Mainstreaming informal finance through networking: an incentives-driven approach 
 
Given the prevalence of the informal financial sector and its capacity for adaptation and innovation, 
special support may be given to informal financial institutions (IFIs), among them financial self-help 
groups in particular. This may entail: (a) enhancing management skills and operational practices; (b) 
transforming rotating and nonrotating savings and credit associations, funeral societies, deposit col-




Box 1:  
Stepwise incentives for mainstreaming as a service to IFIs 
Mainstreaming  Incentive 
1.   Registration  Basic training (accounting) 
2.   Reporting  Financial management training 
3.   Legal status  Consultancy services in good practices  
4.   Prudential norms  Liquidity exchange and refinancing 
5.   Supervision  Accreditation with a seal of quality 
 
origin - into financial intermediaries with a permanent loan fund; (c) availing of opportunities for 
upgrading to regulated financial institutions and mainstreaming into the formal financial sector; and 
(d) entering into linkages with commercial banks. A particular strategy to be supported by donors, in 
partnership with an NGO, might be 
upgrading & mainstreaming through 
networking among informal IFIs as an 
incentives-driven option.   IFIs may be 
offered assistance to establish networks 
and enlist as members. The network may 
be registered under a suitable legal form: 
as an association, a foundation, a 
cooperative, a company and eventually 
perhaps, at a higher evolutionary stage, a formal financial apex institution. In a stepwise order, the 
network may offer services as an incentive to join: training, consultancy, book-keeping tools, legal 
assistance, exchange of experience, interest representation, dialogues with local and national authorities, 
auditing & supervision services, liquidity exchange, and commercial bank linkages. As members of the 
network, IFIs are free to choose whether they remain informal network members or, with network assis-
tance, seek a semiformal or formal status for themselves.  Incentives for mainstreaming are listed in Box 
1; a basic LogFrame for donor intervention is given inAnnex 1. 
 
 
3.2 Financial Service Associations (FSAs): an option pioneered by IFAD 
 
The concept and development of Financial Service Associations (FSAs) are an IFAD innovations 
built on the principles of indigenous nonrotating savings and credit associations: proximity, local 
financial intermediation, ownership and self-management by the poor, self-reliance, and sustainabil-
ity. With a view to promoting cost-effective delivery of financial services at the village level in areas 
devoid of banking facilities, IFAD first introduced this model in the Republic of South Africa in 
1994, followed by the Republic of Congo in 1996, and in the Republics of Guinea and Benin in 1997. 
Introduction of the model in Ghana, particularly in the northern regions with sparse rural banking 
facilities, is under preparation. The FSA model avoids use of external funds by mobilizing local 
savings in the form of equity and transforming them into small loans to shareholders for quick turn-
around activities. The salient features of the FSA model are as follows: 
 
(a)  Proximity.  An FSA is a joint stock company with a variable capital that is owned and operated 
by shareholders, who are local residents. 
(b)  Savings.  Mobilization of local savings is as equity or stock, rather than demand deposits.  Local 
resource accumulation and security of savings are major incentives for buying shares. 
(c)  Accounting.  Record keeping, including the annual closing of accounts, is done locally by the 
FSA itself.  Accounting and administrative procedures are simplified and transparent and are ba-
sed on local practices and experience. 
(d)  Management Autonomy.  All decisions are taken and carried out by shareholders themselves 
including creditworthiness examinations. There is no ceiling on the number of shares held by a 
member; but no shareholder can have more than 10 votes in the General Assembly where all ma-
jor management decisions are taken. 
(e)  Controls.  The mechanisms for internal and external controls constitute a coherent whole that 
facilitates the rapid attainment of autonomy and self-regulation. 
(f)  Profitability.  The shareholders themselves define the FSA’s strategy for profit generation; con-
cern for profitability is an integral part of all decision-making. 
(g)  Lending Operations.  FSA mobilizes financial resources in the form of equity from within its area 
of operations for investment back into the area.  The main financial product of the FSA is repre-




80% of the membership.  Its offer of financial services may be expanded but only after participa-
tory analysis both of the costs of credit and of ways to attain an acceptable trade-off between the 
financial health of the FSA and the profitability to borrowers. 
(h)  Sustainability.  The members define their own strategies for risk management, for constituting 
reserves, for remunerating capital and for making allocations for operating costs, bad debt provi-
sioning and the preservation of the value of capital against inflation. 
(i)  Networking.  The creation of FSAs is able to stimulate the emergence of local institutions and 
networks providing central services to the FSAs.  As intermediaries, FSAs are able to facilitate 
access by formal financial institutions to the rural markets. 
 
Thus, the FSA concept is a flexible microfinance model for delivery of low-cost financial services to 
rural areas by establishing village-level financial structures that are initiated, owned, and operated by 
villagers themselves. It represents yet another solution to the lack of interaction between formal and 
informal financial entities. (The World Bank & IFAD 2000, Working Paper I, Part C, pp. 8-9) 
 
 
3.3   Linkage banking 
 
At their own initiative (and sometimes aided by consultancy proposals), informal financial institutions 
have entered into numerous linkages, mostly depositing savings in cooperatives and banks. But being 
informal, these institutions had great difficulty in accessing credit from those banks or cooperatives. 
This is where APRACA, a Bangkok-based association of central and rural-agricultural banks in Asia 
and the Pacific, intervened. An increasing number of member institutions, such as Bank Indonesia, 
Landbank in the Philippines, NABARD in India and BAAC in Thailand, have encouraged banks and 
NGOs to cooperate on the commercial terms of existing financial self-help groups (Ghate 1992; Kropp 
et al. 1989; Seibel & Parhusip 1992; Seibel 1996), thereby reducing the transaction costs of lenders and 
borrowers as well as deposit takers and depositors. This has worked well in Asian countries where 
policy frameworks have favored financial innovations, cost-covering interest rates and institutional 
viability. In Africa, where policy environments are unfavorable  - or less stable, as in Nigeria, 
APRACA's sister organization AFRACA found it more difficult to promote linkage banking. However, 
some of its member institutions, such as CNCA in Burkina Faso, AFC in Zimbabwe, and the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, have taken promising initiatives. In Ghana, the World Bank, IFAD and the African 
Development Bank are preparing a new initiative of linking indigenous savings and credit associations, 
the so-called susu clubs, and daily deposit collectors to banks. 
 
 
3.4  NGOs as promoters of good practices 
 
NGOs can have a special role to play in the promotion of sound microfinancial institutions. They can 
disseminate information and organize exposure training programs such as the one provided by the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Through training, they can assist small institutions to improve their 
viability and upgrade their legal status, as required. They can also initiate financial operations which, in 
many countries, precludes deposit collection. But if they are seriously interested in financial operations, 
they should register as a rural or commercial bank, finance company or savings and credit cooperative. 
Among those that have successfully embarked on this road are, to name but a few: BancoSol in Bolivia, 
Bank Purba Danarta and numerous other NGO banks in Indonesia, and CARD Rural Bank in the 
Philippines (Seibel & Torres 1999. 
 
NGOs may propagate good microfinance practices (but not best practices, which evokes notions of 
universally valid optimal solutions). Good practices are crucial to the sustainability of microfinance 





•  the mobilization of internal resources for institutional self-reliance through savings 
collection, higher interest rates on loans, share capital, profits and insurance premiums;  
•  the promotion of microsavings as a source of microenterprise or farm household self-
financing, including voluntary withdrawable savings, time deposits, mandatory regular 
savings, lottery savings, and daily savings collection on doorsteps; 
•  appropriate microcredit products with small loan sizes growing according to repayment 
performance and absorptive capacity, mostly short maturities and installments according to 
customer capacity, insistence on timely repayment, and market rates of interest covering the 
costs of each product;  
•  microinsurance products contributing to loan security, such as life, health, cattle insurance;  
•  product reciprocity, tying credit to savings and insurance to enhance financial discipline and 
bankability; 
•  collection reciprocity as a means of arrears prevention, combining savings and loan 
installment collection or financial and commodity transactions;  
•  customer-oriented microfinance procedures and services set by financial institutions rather 
than government, including sound financial management, convenient collection and deposit 
facilities, appropriate loan processing, adequate risk management, timely repayment 
collection, monitoring and effective information gathering;  
•  terms and conditions which benefit from the experience of formal and nonformal 
institutions and serve the interests of both the institution and its customers.  
 
 




The evolution from rotating savings groups to non-rotating credit groups has been accompanied by a 
shift from oral rules and regulations to written bye-laws. In their simplest form, they may read like the 
rules of a so-called money company found in in a small Mano village in the Liberian hinterland in 1967: 
 
  "All members should agree upon one sum of money to be paid every Sunday. And one late to 
pay that Sunday five cents interest will be added to the sum he suppose to pay. Members should 
always put in the income; No matter how hard money business might be; you will have to put in 
the income. The five officers should agree before the money should be loaned to someone." 
  "Any money missing from the bank the Treasurer is responsible to pay for what is missing." 
  "Time for the income: Every Sunday." ( Literal transcription) (Seibel & Massing 1974:76) 
 
Prudential regulation and supervision 
 
Under conditions of a repressive policy environment, IFIs and other unregulated MFIs have a com-
petitive advantage as they are free to set their own interest rates and other contract terms. Many IFIs 
remain informal simply because there is no suitable legal form available, or at least no legal form 
with sufficiently low minimum equity capital requirements, or with capital adequacy ratios instead. 
However, once the policy environment is deregulated and entrance barriers are removed, much may 
be gained from prudential regulation and supervision. Three reform measures are of crucial impor-
tance for the upgrading of IFIs into regulated MFIs:  
 
(1)  the deregulation of interest rates on deposits and loans:  
  permitting each institution to adjust its interest rates to its effective costs, including those of 





(2)  a revision of the banking law:  
  permitting local people to establish their own small financial institutions with moderate 
minimum capital requirements, or else capital adequacy ratios (higher than those for 
commercial banks). In addition, the legal system should provide for alienable land-use or 
ownership rights as a basis for collateral and for the efficient processing of claims arising from 
bad debts. 
 
(3)  the provision of effective bank supervision:  
  providing guidance and supervision to institutions with microfinancial services in the interest of 
both the MFIs and their clients. In the case of a multitude of small local microfinance 
institutions, such supervision may be provided by separate, second-tier regulatory authorities 
within a delegated system of regulation and supervision, i.e., through self-organized networks of 
MFIs which in turn are supervised by the financial authorities. 
 
Do MFIs benefit from banking status? 
 
Or should they remain hidden within a nonformal financial sector? The answer is an unequivocal 
‘yes’, they should stay informal if the policy environment is repressive, enforcing interest rate regula-
tion, submitting institutions to inappropriate supervisory agencies, or simply barring institutions from 
sound practices. In many countries, equity capital requirements are such that banking status is beyond 
the reach of local MFIs; and the only way for IFIs to register and thereby turn into semiformal MFIs 
is under the Societies Act, as non-stock, non-profit corporations, private or public trusts, or coopera-
tives. Upgrading to some legal status may enable the institutions to substantially increase their assets 
and continue building them up instead of redistributing them periodically among the members, as is 
done by most IFIs. 
 
An example are the the Lumbung Pitih  Nagari (LPN) among the Minangkabau in West Sumatra, 
Indonesia. They have evolved from two informal institutional sources: the communal rice store, 
lumbung pitih, and the rotating savings group, julo-julo. As money was substituted for rice, about 500 
LPN turned into semiformal financial institutions owned by their members and registered with the 
provincial government. With the creation of a new provincial law during the 1970s, which does not 
come under the national banking law, legal upgrading followed institutional evolution. The provincial 
government gave the LPN an equity injection, which approximately half of them used for the purpose of 
growing in financial strength and outreach. In 1988, with the passing of a village banking law, LPN 
entered into yet another phase of legal evolution, meaning that they could now register as formal village 
banks, Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (Seibel 1989:24  -31). An increasing number of LPN has taken 
advantage of this option in recent years, with substantial upscaling effects on their operations. 
 
Towards  delegated regulation and supervision 
 
Upgrading large numbers of IFIs into formal microfinance institutions poses new supervision prob-
lems. Supervising large numbers of MFIs exceeds the capacity of most central banks or bank superin-
tendencies in developing countries. In a number of countries - among them Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Vietnam, Tanzania and several Latin American countries - discussions are now under way to estab-
lish a second-tier regulatory authority as a self-regulatory and self-supervisory apex organization for 
MFIs. In Nigeria, such a delegated system exists already for community banks.  
 
However, most of the discussion on institutional upgrading, regulation and supervision centers on 
semiformal institutions initiated and supported by NGOs and other donors. Much remains to be done, 





Mainstreaming informal financial institutions: objective, key results and outputs 
 
Objective:  Informal financial institutions (IFIs) are upgraded and mainstreamed 
 
1.   Networking among IFIs is facilitated 
1.1  Institutional patterns of forming financial grassroots organizations  are analysed (eg, rotating and 
nonrotating savings & credit associations, self-help groups with financial services such as water-user 
associations or women’s groups, deposit collectors, moneylenders) 
1.2  Existing IFIs of the poor are identified  
1.3  The poor are assisted in joining local IFIs owned and managed by the poor 
1.4  Networking among IFIs is facilitated 
1.5  Central network services are promoted as incentives to join the network (such as: training, consultancy, 
book-keeping tools, legal assistance, exchange of experience, interest representation, dialogues with local 
and national authorities, auditing & supervision, liquidity exchange, and commercial bank linkages) 
1.6  Voluntary registration of IFIs is facilitated 
1.7  NGOs are supported as facilitators of  IFI networks and trainers of  IFIs 
1.8  Prudential norms are agreed upon  
 
2.  Mainstreaming is initiated by incentives to IFIs  
2.1  Basic accounting training is provided as an incentive for registration with a network 
2.2  Financial management training is provided as an incentive for financial reporting to the network 
2.3  Consultancy services in good practices are provided as an incentive to acquire a legal status 
2.4  Liquidity exchange and refinancing services are provided as an incentive to follow prudential norms 
2.5  Accreditation with a seal of quality is provided as an incentive to submit to external supervision 
 
3.  Upgrading of IFIs is facilitated  
3.1  Legal upgrading to attain a suitable legal status is facilitated 
3.2  Human upgrading through staff and financial management training is facilitated 
3.3  Organisational upgrading, converting rotating groups (RoSCAs, tontines), funeral societies, deposit 
collectors and other IFIs into permanent institutions with a loan fund built from equity, deposits and 
fees or premiums 
3.4  Operational upgrading, including proper book-keeping, effective financial products, reporting to the 
network, is facilitated 
3.5  Financial upgrading in terms of self-reliance (mobilizing internal resources), viability (covering costs 
from operating income) and sustainability & outreach (increasing earnings for expansion) is facilitated 
 
4.  Access to banks (Linkage Banking) on commercial terms is facilitated 
4.1  Refinancing services are provided  
4.2  Deposit services are provided  
4.3  Payment services are provided  
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